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Abstract 
Fibre deployment of next-generation high-speed broadband networks is considered to be a decisive 
development for any information-based society, yet investment activities and especially the adoption 
of fibre-based broadband services take place only very gradually in most countries. This work 
identifies the most important determinants of the adoption of fibre-based broadband services, using the 
most recent panel data from the European Union member states (EU27) for the years from 2004 to 
2012.  
The results show that the stricter previous broadband access regulation has a negative impact on 
adoption, while competitive pressure from mobile networks affects adoption in a non-linear manner. It 
appears that the approach of strict cost-based access regulation embedded in the EU regulatory 
framework is at odds with the targets outlined in the European Commission’s “Digital Agenda”. 
Finally, we also find strong evidence for network effects underlying the adoption process. 
[1] 
1 Introduction 
The traditional (“first-generation” copper- or coax-based) broadband networks appear to be outdated 
and it has become necessary to speed up these networks in recent years to account for the growing 
demand for bandwidth/connection speed. According to “Nielsen’s law”, the broadband connection 
speed increases every year by 50% (FTTH Council Europe 2012, p. 12). Next-generation fibre-based 
access (NGA) networks deployed on the ground provide almost unlimited bandwidth capacity. As 
these networks represent a general purpose technology, they are expected to induce significant 
productivity improvements and growth across major economic sectors such as health, electricity and 
transport (e.g. Czernich et al. 2011).
 
However, substituting the traditional infrastructure with fibre-
optic networks also involves massive investment volumes.
1
  
The demand in terms of adoption (penetration) and supply-side activities in terms of investment in 
fibre-based network infrastructure (coverage) vary significantly in an international comparison. Most 
European countries lag far behind the leading Asian fibre nations (such as Japan, Korea, Taiwan and 
Hong Kong), but also behind the development in the US (Briglauer and Gugler 2012). As regards 
NGA adoption within Europe, Northern and Eastern European economies are leading by a large 
margin with NGA household adoption levels between ~10% (Denmark and Latvia) and ~26% 
(Lithuania) at the end of 2011. Exceptional cases are Belgium and Luxembourg, where the focus on 
less expensive NGA deployment technologies has facilitated adoption levels of ~45% and ~85%, 
respectively. However, most of the other European countries still show NGA adoption levels (far) 
below 5%, including all the major Western and Southern European economies.
2
  
Europe’s gap in NGA deployment was recognized by the European Commission (EC) and explicitly 
addressed in its “Digital Agenda”, which specifies goals in terms of high-speed broadband coverage 
and penetration.
3
 In achieving these goals, one of the most controversial regulatory issues in Europe 
(and elsewhere) is whether the emerging NGA infrastructure should be subjected to sector-specific ex 
ante access regulation. Former – mostly state-owned – telecommunications monopolists 
(“incumbents”) argue that sector-specific ex ante regulation restricts their ability to generate future 
revenues. Accordingly, fibre roll-out could only, if at all, be achieved on the basis of the deregulation 
                                                     
1
 The total investments in nationwide NGA deployment (coverage) depend inter alia on the network topology 
employed and the targeted coverage levels and amount to billions of euros (wik consult 2008).  
2
  See Figure A.1 in the Annex, which reports time-series plots for high- and low-cost NGA deployment 
scenarios for the EU27 countries. 
3
  The Digital Agenda “seeks to ensure that, by 2020, (i) all Europeans have access to much higher internet 
speeds of above 30 Mbps and (ii) 50% or more of European households subscribe to internet connections 
above 100 Mbps” (European Commission 2010a, p. 19). Whereas the target in (i) refers to a coverage level 
of 100%, the target in (ii) is related to a minimum household adoption level subject to quality characteristics 
that can be realized only with NGA technologies.  
[2] 
of the relevant markets; at least a temporary removal of ex ante obligations (“regulatory holidays”) is 
deemed to be essential. Regulation of network access would, in turn, be detrimental to dynamic 
efficiency in terms of investment incentives and infrastructure innovation. Instead, it would be 
sufficient to rely on market mechanisms and infrastructure-based competition in particular. 
Conversely, alternative operators that are dependent on access regulation (“service-based entrants”) as 
well as some national regulatory authorities (NRAs) fear the rise of NGA networks as another 
upcoming monopolistic infrastructure, if regulation is released or removed entirely. They argue that 
incumbent firms or other alternative NGA infrastructure operators would gain an essential and long-
lasting competitive (“first-mover”) advantage, which implies the need to have appropriate ex ante 
regulation in place. Regulatory-induced service-based competition would also have an immediate 
effect on static efficiency in terms of lower prices and hence on the adoption of (new) communications 
technologies on the demand side. 
Based on an unbalanced panel of the EU27 member states for the years from 2004 to 2012, this paper 
addresses the following research questions: (i) What is the impact of broadband access regulations on 
NGA adoption? (ii) How does infrastructure-based competition stemming from wireless (mobile) 
networks influence the extent of NGA adoption? (iii) What is the role played by network effects that 
might lead to an endogenous adoption process? This paper represents the first European-based attempt 
to quantify the determinants of NGA adoption with the most recent country-level data. A multiplicity 
of methods and a broad set of control variables serve as important robustness checks. Furthermore, we 
argue that there is no endogeneity problem in terms of reverse causality in the empirical specification, 
which relates first-generation broadband demand- and supply-side factors to second-generation NGA 
markets and services.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. First, we review the recent and most relevant 
contributions in the empirical literature in section 2. Section 3 briefly provides the necessary 
background information on the technical context of NGA networks. Section 4 then describes basic 
hypotheses concerning the role of sector-specific regulation and competition as well as the other main 
cost and demand factors. Section 5 describes our data set. Section 6 presents the empirical 
specification and our identification strategy. Section 7 discusses the main empirical results. To 
conclude, section 8 summarizes and contains some final remarks.  
2 Literature review 
The empirical literature related to the impact of broadband access regulations and competition can be 
divided into three broad categories: (i) quantitative analysis focusing on the impact on investment; (ii) 
quantitative analysis focusing on the impact on adoption (penetration); and (iii) qualitative analysis 
with a focus on penetration or investment. The latter appears to be most meritorious in the case of too 
few observations in which quantitative analysis cannot provide reliable guidance. However, we think 
[3] 
that the availability of NGA-related data is sufficient now to allow robust statistical analysis. 
Accordingly, in this section we focus on quantitative studies only and do not review the literature 
related to qualitative studies.
4
 When reviewing the quantitative literature, one has to be aware of the 
heavily interest-driven nature of the discussion and of the fact that a large number of contributions 
represent directly industry-sponsored work. This seems to be especially relevant to econometrics work 
due to its high sensitivity to the methodological specifications and “the opacity of its techniques to the 
vast majority of policy makers” (Berkman Center 2010, p. 96). Therefore, our literature review also 
excludes industry-sponsored work that has not been published in peer-reviewed academic journals.  
Regarding the impact of regulation on investment (i), Jung et al. (2008), who use US data for the years 
from 1997 to 2002, find that infrastructure competition increases the investment incentives while 
mandatory access obligations at best have a weak effect on the investment of infrastructure operators. 
Recent work with data from EU countries exhibits similar results: Grajek and Röller (2011) investigate 
the relationship between regulation and total investment in the telecommunications industry. Their 
study is among the few that explicitly account for the endogeneity problem of regulation and 
investment. Investment is quantified therein rather broadly by the tangible fixed assets of 
telecommunications operators and, thus, does not explicitly refer to broadband or NGA deployment. 
Wallsten and Hausladen (2009) are the first to estimate the effects of broadband access regulation on 
NGA deployment. They find that countries where broadband access regulation is more effective 
experience lower fibre deployment. However, they use data for the years from 2002 to 2007, which 
only cover the NGA roll-out in its very early stage and the authors do not capture the investment 
dynamics. Briglauer et al. (2013) investigate the determinants of NGA investment with a direct 
measure of real NGA investment for yearly data from 2005 to 2011. They find that stricter previous 
broadband access regulation has a negative impact on NGA deployment, while competitive pressure 
from cable and mobile networks affects NGA deployment in a non-linear manner.  
Regarding the literature on the impact of regulation on adoption (ii), there are several contributions 
related to broadband markets, but actually no NGA-related studies. Using US data from 2001 to 2004, 
Denni and Gruber (2007) find that infrastructure-based competition has a positive impact on 
broadband diffusion in the longer term, whereas regulatory-induced service-based competition has a 
positive impact only if the number of service-based entrants is not too large. Non-US-based work 
mainly refers to OECD country-level data. Bouckaert et al. (2010) examine the determinants of 
broadband penetration for the years from 2003 to 2008. They find that infrastructure-based 
competition has a positive impact on broadband penetration, whereas service-based competition is an 
impediment to penetration. Lee et al. (2011) analyse the determinants of broadband diffusion for the 
years from 2000 to 2008. With respect to unbundling obligations, the authors find a positive and 
                                                     
4
  A comprehensive overview of qualitative studies can be found in Berkman Center (2010, pp. 121–136). Our 
review also excludes a number of recent quantitative studies in which the data are based on surveys (e.g. 
Sunada et al. 2011) and that do not consider inter alia the role of regulation and competition. 
[4] 
significant effect on the speed of diffusion. They admit, however, that unbundling might have a 
negative impact on long-term investment and the broadband saturation level. Cava-Ferreruela and 
Alabau-Munoz (2006) find that infrastructure-based competition has a significant and positive impact 
on broadband penetration, whereas unbundling has no significant effect for data from 2000 to 2002. 
Finally, some contributions refer to data from European countries. Distaso et al. (2006) analyse EU-
related data from 2001 to 2004 and find that infrastructure-based competition is the main driver of 
broadband take-up and plays a more important role in penetration than service-based competition, 
especially in the longer term. Höffler (2007) examines data for sixteen Western European countries for 
the years from 2000 to 2004. He concludes that broadband deployment was predominantly triggered 
by infrastructure-based competition, with service-based competition playing a secondary role.  
Summarizing, the majority of the empirical literature suggests that infrastructure-based competition 
has a positive impact on both investment and penetration. In turn, the evidence regarding service-
based competition relying on broadband access regulations tends to be negatively related to 
investment activities, while the impact on broadband adoption seems to be less clear. To the best of the 
author’s knowledge, there is no empirical work that employs a direct measure of NGA adoption and 
examines the causal impact of regulation and competition. This paper intends to fill this gap. 
3 Relevant NGA scenarios 
Historically, first-generation legacy networks
5
 deployed twisted copper-wire pairs to overcome the last 
mile (“local loop”) to the subscriber in order to provide narrow bandwidth voice telephony services 
(POTS/ISDN) only. Many decades later, they were made capable of supporting broadband services by 
means of digital subscriber line (DSL) transmission technology. However, due to technical reasons, the 
bandwidth of DSL technologies is limited. In order to realize the NGA characteristic bandwidth, it is 
necessary to shorten the length of the copper-based local loops by placing the DSL transmission 
equipment closer to the retail customers’ premises, e.g. in the cabinets that house distribution frames 
(“fibre to the cabinet” – FTTC). In the remaining copper-wire line of the last mile, the latest DSL 
transmission technology is used. This solution can provide bandwidths of 20 Mbit/s to 100 Mbit/s. In 
addition to upgrading first-generation copper-wire (DSL) networks in the local loop, the roll-out of 
high-speed communications networks might also be realized by upgrading cable (coax) television 
networks, which is referred to as “fibre to the last amplifer”, which provides bandwidths up to 150 
Mbit/s. Similar or even higher bandwidths (above 100/150 Mbit/s) can be achieved if optical fibre is 
extended to or into the building (“fibre to the building” – FTTB). Only the remaining wiring inside the 
building relies on conventional copper wires. If the optical line is directly connected to the individual 
                                                     
5
 This term refers to networks already in existence and historically owned exclusively by incumbent operators.  
[5] 
home (“fibre to the home” – FTTH), this would be the most future-proof technological solution, as it 
enables a large number of future services with nearly unlimited bandwidth (RTR 2010, pp. 189–191).6  
FTTx stands for a family of technologies that includes all the NGA scenarios described above. As 
such, it differs from a more narrow definition that refers to cost-intensive FTTH/B technologies only 
in the case that the fibre infrastructure terminates inside or no more than two metres away from the 
consumers’ building, either the basement, the house or the apartment.7  
During the relevant analysis period (2004 to 2012), mobile broadband access has already been 
facilitated by 3G+ technologies such as GPRS, EDGE, UMTS and HSDPA. Moreover, the industry 
expects long-term evolution (LTE) to enable transmission rates similar to wireline NGA (FTTx) 
scenarios in the near future. Currently, however, LTE is still in the test phase and the aforementioned 
mobile broadband standards are far from achieving FTTx-specific bandwidth levels. Therefore, mobile 
broadband is not considered to be a relevant (second-generation) NGA technology in the empirical 
analysis. 
4 Hypotheses 
From the empirical literature, one can infer that there is a common understanding that both demand-
side and supply-side factors have an influence on the adoption of fibre-based broadband services. 
Although the drivers of demand differ from the drivers of supply, most studies implicitly refer to a 
direct and positive relationship between investment (coverage) and adoption (penetration). Clearly, 
network coverage is a pre-condition for the successful adoption of NGA services and therefore the 
higher the available infrastructure stock, the higher the potential subscriber base (Wallsten and 
Hausladen 2009; Bouckaert et al. 2010).
8
 This section identifies the determinants of NGA investment 
and adoption and sets out corresponding hypotheses, which are aligned with the underlying research 
questions. Sections 4.1 and 4.2 focus on regulation and competition as the main explanatory variables 
that directly impact on the supply side, i.e. NGA investment. Likewise, cost conditions will shift the 
supply curve but also exert an indirect impact on NGA adoption (section 4.3). Finally, the adoption 
process will be directly influenced by diverse demand-side factors and network effects (section 4.4). 
However, the demand will also be related to regulation and competition, which affect prices and 
quality and thus indirectly the adoption of NGA services.  
                                                     
6
  Full definitions of terms are also available at: http://s.ftthcouncil.org/files/FTTH-Definitions-
Revision_January_2009_0.pdf.  
7
  Because the length of FTTH/B lines is longer compared with other FTTx technologies and thus services a 
much smaller customer base in the local loop, the average investment per FTTH/B connection is 
disproportionately higher (wik consult, 2008). 
8
  In our panel data set, Pearson’s bivariate correlation coefficients for FTTx coverage and FTTx adoption are 
0.7014 and 0.6982 in terms of connections per household and per capita, respectively.  
[6] 
4.1 Regulation 
In EU member states, where asymmetric ex ante regulation is imposed on first-generation broadband 
markets, alternative operators can rent the local loop from the incumbent operator based on cost-
oriented access charges (“unbundling”). This allows alternative operators to provide (first of all) 
broadband services. Service-based entrants may also offer retail broadband services by purchasing 
“bitstream” as a wholesale input from the incumbent operator but at a more service-based level of the 
value chain. Finally, “resale” means that access-seeking service providers receive and resell a 
wholesale input of the incumbent operator with virtually no scope for technological product 
differentiation (RTR 2010, pp. 176, 179). 
NGA regulations will be defined and imposed by NRAs only in future decisions or, if already 
implemented, the effectiveness of these decisions still remains to be seen (Cullen International 2011, 
Tables 4, 9 and 10). It can be argued, however, that past regulation in first-generation broadband 
markets has clearly shaped the expectations for NGA regulations. This has been recently confirmed in 
NGA-relevant recommendations of the EC as well as in previous court decisions.
9
  
On the one hand, stricter wholesale access regulations increase service-based competition at the retail 
level in terms of lower broadband prices, exerting a positive impact on the demand side.
10
 On the other 
hand, tight regulation of existing broadband access products most likely, as mentioned above, creates 
corresponding expectations about the future regulation of NGA access products that decrease the 
investment incentives of (potential) infrastructure operators for the following: (i) imposing cost-
oriented access prices for bottleneck inputs typically reduces profits or precludes excess profits of the 
regulated firm, which results in asymmetric distribution of the expected profits and, therefore, in a 
lower net present value of investment projects (Valetti 2003). Furthermore, access regulation typically 
ignores (ii) the opportunity costs of real options (Guthrie 2009) and the fact that (iii) risks were 
distributed asymmetrically among regulated incumbent and entrant operators. Therefore, (iv) 
regulation reduces not only the investment incentives of regulated infrastructure operators but also 
those of potential entrant infrastructure operators who benefit from a risk-free option due to mandatory 
access obligations asymmetrically imposed on the incumbent operator (Pindyck 2007). Finally, 
pending decisions on NGA regulations have already led to substantial regulatory uncertainty, which 
constitutes another investment impediment. According to Nitsche and Wiethaus (2011), who model the 
                                                     
9
  The NGA recommendation of the European Commission (2010b) as well as former draft versions clearly 
indicate that the EC is very much determined to extend its cost-based regulatory approach to the emerging 
NGA communications infrastructure. The reader is also referred to the earlier decision of the German 
Government to exempt the incumbent operator (Deutsche Telekom AG) from wholesale access obligations 
to its new infrastructure (FTTC) network (“regulatory holidays”). The EC, however, took Germany to court 
over this legal provision in 2007, which finally decided against it in 2009 (C-424/07).  
10
  Lower first-generation broadband prices do not necessarily imply higher levels of adoption of second-
generation NGA services. Section 5.2.3 outlines the potential impact of broadband prices in more detail as 
well as our underlying assumptions. 
[7] 
effects of different regulatory regimes on NGA investment, a regime of less intense access regulations 
or regulatory holidays would have the most positive effects on investment, whereas the current EU 
standard of strict cost-based access regulation turns out to be inferior.
11
 
Summarizing, we expect that ex ante sector-specific regulation in the form of mandatory access 
regimes has a negative impact on NGA investment and hence indirectly also on the adoption of NGA 
services. Higher levels of regulatory-induced service-based competition, however, might also have an 
opposite effect via lowering prices, which would increase demand and NGA adoption. 
4.2 Competition 
Telecommunications, by all means, have become one of the most dynamic and competitive industries 
since the beginning of the EU liberalization process in 1997/98. Likewise, recent and future 
investment in NGA is driven by infrastructure-based competition, most notably from mobile networks 
(“intermodal”), which “threaten” first-generation (copper and cable) networks and services. The so-
called phenomenon of fixed-to-mobile substitution has already been quite intense with respect to 
narrowband voice telephony services at the beginning of NGA deployment (around 2005) and has 
become increasingly important until now, not only regarding voice telephony but also more and more 
to broadband services.
12
  
With respect to the potential impact of intermodal competition on NGA investment, one has to 
distinguish the following opposing effects (Aghion et al. 2005). On the one hand, competitive markets 
bear incentives for innovative investment in view of temporary market power rents that can be 
captured (the “escape competition effect”), leading to a positive relation between intermodal 
competition and NGA investment. Indeed, the deployment of NGA networks can be seen as the “last 
chance” for traditional wireline infrastructure operators to escape successfully from broadband 
competition stemming from mobile networks with innovative and high-bandwidth-demanding NGA 
services that cannot be realized by means of mobile broadband technologies in the foreseeable future. 
On the other hand, intense intermodal competition in terms of pronounced fixed-to-mobile substitution 
will eventually reduce the potential rents and, thus, increasingly counteract NGA investment because 
                                                     
11
  See also Briglauer and Gugler (2012), who evaluate NGA deployment and adoption in different 
geographical areas (Asia, the EU and the US) in view of the underlying regulatory approaches with a 
particular focus on the investment incentives of the current EU regulatory framework.  
12
  According to the the EC’s “Indicators on the electronic communications market”, the average EU mobile 
broadband penetration of all users (PCs/laptops and handheld devices) is about 41%, whereas the EU 
average fixed broadband penetration is 27.7% (including basic and high-speed connections) as of January 
2012. Regarding the number of subscribers, fixed-to-mobile substitution is even more pronounced: whereas 
the average EU number of mobile subscribers increased constantly up to 127% by the end of 2011, the 
average number of fixed-line connections has decreased significantly in recent years. All the data are 
available from the EC’s Digital Agenda Scoreboard website: http://ec.europa.eu/digital-
agenda/en/scoreboard.  
[8] 
operators will no longer be able to appropriate the necessary profits from NGA investment (the 
“Schumpeterian” effect).  
Finally, one has to consider the “replacement effect” (Arrow 1962), according to which new NGA 
investment would “cannibalize” quasi-monopolistic profits from old first-generation infrastructure 
services, increasing the opportunity costs and thus reducing the incentive to invest.
13
 The replacement 
effect appears to be of practical relevance, as most EU27 member states have well-established first-
generation infrastructure in view of both network coverage and recent and foreseeable advances in 
DSL/cable technology standards. As a result, conventional broadband services enjoy broad consumer 
acceptance in most EU member states, which also establishes non-negligible switching costs on the 
consumers’ side and hinders migration to the new technology unless its incremental benefits are large 
and transparent enough for consumers (Grajek and Kretschmer 2009, p. 241). 
In summary, we expect a non-linear relationship between NGA investment and the intensity of 
infrastructure-based (intermodal) competition from mobile networks. An increase in competitive 
intensity might have – in the same manner as regulatory-induced service-based competition – a 
positive impact on the adoption of NGA services, i.e. on the demand side, as infrastructure-based 
competition enhances services
14
 and reduces the average broadband price level. With respect to the 
replacement effect, we expect that a higher diffusion of first-generation broadband (intramodal) 
connections leads to a lower adoption rate of second-generation NGA services. 
4.3 Cost factors  
The civil engineering and construction costs related to digging represent by far the most relevant cost 
drivers for NGA deployment. As these cost factors are largely fixed and sunk costs, one can expect 
that the average deployment costs will decrease with the number of broadband/NGA subscribers 
(“economies of density”; wik consult 2008). Furthermore, these deployment costs will crucially 
depend on largely time-invariant topographic and demographic characteristics, such as urbanization, 
population or household density and housing structure; in particular, the number of multi-dwelling 
units is a major issue (FTTH Council Europe 2012, pp. 24–25). 
Relevant institutional factors, such as regulations on capital costs, rights of way and digging or other 
allowances and technical standards, local availability and reusability of ducts and dark fibre or NGA-
specific state aid policies, also show hardly any variation with respect to the relevant time frame of our 
analysis.  
                                                     
13
  See Bourreau et al. (2010) for a more general description of the replacement effect in the communications 
industry. 
14
  Whereas the main merits of regulation and service-based competition refer to lower prices, including pricing 
innovations and customer care, infrastructure-based competition also has the technical potential to enhance 
services via quality innovation. 
[9] 
4.4 Demand factors 
The demand depends on the average price for high-speed broadband services, the overall market size 
in terms of total communications expenditure and consumer wealth in general. Consumers with higher 
average communications expenditures can be regarded as having greater affinity with information and 
communications technologies (ICT), which might result in higher levels of NGA adoption (FTTH 
Council Europe 2012, p. 42). The demand for NGA services is also driven by a variety of consumer 
preferences, referring to the overall affinity with ICT, conventional Internet usage and usage intensity 
of high-speed broadband services. Consumers’ needs are furthermore determined by their average 
education levels, since higher levels of education improve e-literacy skills, which considerably 
increases the utility derived from NGA technologies. Also, more highly educated people tend to be 
more prone to adopting and experimenting with new ICT (Kiiski and Pohjola 2002, p. 302).  
Finally, one has to consider network effects as a special type of externality underlying the NGA 
adoption process, in case the number of subscribers (and/or producers) has an impact on the 
consumers’ utility (firms’ profit) (Shy 2010). In general, increases in the adoption rates also lead to 
increases in the usage intensity of the respective services (Grajek and Kretschmer 2009, p. 240). 
Consumers’ utility can be related to the possibility of communicating with one another at the consumer 
level either directly, e.g. via different “Web 2.0” platforms, or indirectly, in the case of network effects 
occuring at different producer levels. For instance, the more users subscribe to (high-speed) Internet 
services, the more specific content and related applications will be programmed, which increases the 
consumers’ utility and willingness to adopt such (NGA) services. The same is true for the development 
of related hardware and electronic equipment. Furthermore, it is likely that the NGA adoption process 
is subject to learning spillovers, inasmuch as the value added of NGA services appears to be a priori 
unknown to potential consumers, whose valuation inter alia depends on the information gathered by 
the already-existing subscriber base (Grajek 2010, p. 133). Operators simply benefit from the network 
size, since an increase in the total number of subscribers lowers the average costs significantly in view 
of the NGA network topology and thus increases the profits.  
All the network effects described above give rise to a self-propelling endogenous growth process, 
which suggests that the contemporaneous and previous NGA adoption rates are positively related, 
leading to a virtuous circle: the higher the existing subscriber base, the higher the potential network 
benefits.  
5 Data and variables 
The empirical specification is based on the following data sources. The “EU Progress Report” 
provides yearly data for all the relevant wholesale broadband access regulations. Our second main 
source is the database of FTTH Council Europe, which includes the annual numbers of connected 
NGA lines for all the EU27 member states. EUROSTAT/COCOM provide data on the total population, 
[10] 
education, Internet usage and ICT labour costs as well as the housing structure. We use the 
International Telecommunications Union (ITU) data to measure intermodal infrastructure competition 
and Quantum-Web tariff data as a representative measure of the average broadband price that is related 
to the first-generation infrastructure. Finally, data from the World Bank provide us with the GDP per 
capita, the European Intelligence Unit (EIU) with measures of labour and wage costs and the 
percentage of people living in urban areas and EUROMONITOR with telecommunications revenues 
and the number of households and Internet users.  
As the data availability differs by variable, we use an unbalanced panel data set of EU27 countries for 
the time range from 2004 to 2011 for yearly data on our independent variables and from 2005 to 2012 
for yearly data on our dependent variable. All the variable definitions and sources as well as summary 
statistics are listed in detail in the Annex in Tables A.1 and A.2, respectively. 
5.1 Dependent variable 
The dependent variable, FTTx_hh, measures adoption as the actual number of NGA connections 
divided by a country’s total number of households.15 In line with the description in section 3, the 
relevant NGA/FTTx technologies include FTTH/B/C and fibre to the last amplifier. The dependent 
variable thus represents the number of households exhibiting sufficient willingness to pay and actively 
using one of the FTTx-based (NGA) services under a commercial contract.  
5.2 Independent variables 
The independent variables can be divided into the following categories: (i) regulation, (ii) 
infrastructure-based competition, (iii) prices and (iv) cost and demand controls.  
5.2.1 Regulation 
The regulation variable, reg_bb, measures the lines actively used by service-based competitors as the 
share of the total regulated wholesale broadband lines (including unbundling, bitstream and resale) 
related to the total retail broadband lines. Therefore, this variable not only includes all the wholesale 
broadband access regulations as outlined in section 4.1, but also provides a direct measure of their 
effectiveness.
16
  
                                                     
15
  The other metric commonly refers to per capita terms. Both measures have their strengths and weaknesses. 
Adoption in per capita terms refers to both business and residential users, whereas household penetration 
omits business customers. However, household subscription data seem to be the more correct measure as 
fixed-wireline (NGA) connections are typically related to a single household but not to an individual 
subscriber (as is the case for wireless subscriptions). Hence, we prefer household data, but – as it will be 
shown – our estimates are robust to the alternative specification in per capita terms. 
16
  As a consequence, we do not have to rely on broadly defined indices, dummy-based scorecards or other 
proxies, which are commonly used in the related literature but hardly related to fixed broadband wholesale 
access regulations (such as the OECD regulatory index for the telecoms sector). The “Polynomics 
[11] 
Furthermore, as outlined in section 4.1, it can be argued that the effectiveness of the regulation of the 
“old” network infrastructure, reg_bb, is exogenous with respect to the deployment of the “new” 
infrastructure. At the same time, previous regulation on broadband markets is a rather reasonable – and 
in fact the best – proxy for expected NGA regulation, inasmuch as reg_bb represents the most relevant 
remedial measures within the EU regulatory framework for electronic communications markets.  
5.2.2 Competition 
The main form of infrastructure-based competition related to first-generation infrastructure services 
stems from mobile networks. The variable fms states the share of fixed landlines in the total number of 
fixed landlines and mobile subscriptions and hence expresses the extent of fixed-to-mobile 
substitution, fms, in a country. Its net impact depends on the relative importance of the escape 
competition and Schumpeterian effect. bb_lines_hh measures a country’s diffusion of first-generation 
(copper and coax) broadband connections and services and, therefore, it directly captures the 
replacement effect and is expected to impact negatively on NGA adoption. Because we can directly 
control for the relevant (intramodal) replacement effect, fms solely reflects the escape competition and 
Schumpeterian effect. Finally, cable measures the share of broadband cable lines run by entrants, 
whereas (1 - cable) roughly corresponds to the share of DSL incumbent broadband lines. Both 
variables measure the relative importance of the main modes of intramodal competition. 
5.2.3 Prices 
As outlined in sections 4.1 and 4.2, the net impact of regulation and competition on NGA adoption is 
undetermined, since regulatory-induced service-based competition influences prices and thus adoption 
on the demand side but it also negatively affects NGA investment on the supply side, which decreases 
NGA adoption. Likewise, a high level of infrastructure-based competition brings down broadband 
prices but, beyond a certain level, also deteriorates NGA investment. In order to isolate the direct 
supply-side effects of the competition and regulation variables, one has to account for the market 
outcome that is related to first-generation competition by controlling for the average broadband price 
level, price_bb. The net impact of the variable price_bb on NGA adoption is determined by the 
following effects: (i) in the case that first- and second-generation broadband services are substitutes, 
an increase in price_bb shifts demand and increases NGA adoption; (ii) to the extent that price_bb 
stands as a proxy for NGA prices, an increase in price_bb will decrease NGA adoption alongside the 
demand curve (own-price effect); (iii) if price_bb stands as a proxy for a general broadband price level 
                                                                                                                                                                      
Regulation Index 2012” (Zenhäusern et al. 2012) is the most related to the EU regulatory framework, but it 
is available only up to 2010 and captures only the formal aspects of regulation and not its effectiveness. 
However, certain access regulations imposed by NRAs might exist on paper for years without any real effect 
on the relevant markets. In contrast, our measure incorporates the actual market effectiveness of ex ante 
regulations by linking these to the corresponding market outcomes (the same argument in favour of 
effectivity-based measures can be found in Bacache et al. 2012 or Briglauer et al. 2013). The Polynomics 
Regulatory Index 2012 is available for the years from 1997 to 2010 at: http://www.polynomics.ch/rdi.php. 
[12] 
that reflects the supply determinants, such as the number of intramodal competitors and first-
generation network topology or the extent of public broadband subsidies, a decrease in price_bb 
increases NGA adoption due to more favourable market conditions. Also, a lower broadband price 
level increases the customer base that might eventually be migrated to NGA services and hence 
increases NGA adoption. Since the definition and the quality characteristics of the broadband price 
variable, price_bb, are distinctively different from representative NGA services and as bb_lines_hh 
controls for the substitute infrastructure, we assume that the effects in (i) and (ii) are dominated by the 
effects in (iii) and thus expect a negative sign of price_bb. 
5.2.4 Cost controls 
We use the following measures for the demographic and topographic cost factors. Whereas urban_pop 
reflects different cost structures due to varying shares of rural and densely populated areas, hh_dens 
represents a country’s average household size and therefore a measure of the housing structure. The 
yearly number of building permissions of multiple dwelling units, mdw, provides another measure of 
household structure. 
We use the following measures for NGA construction costs: whereas lab_cost represents an annual 
labour cost index, lab_cost_ICT gives an annual labour cost index that is related to ICT industries and 
wage measures manufacturing costs per hour. 
5.2.5 Demand controls 
The total telecommunications revenues normalized to households, telco_rev_hh, act as a proxy for the 
ICT market size and, thus, for the overall willingness to pay for broadband/NGA services in a country. 
GDP_pc_pp measures income effects. Furthermore, we include the variable iday, which provides the 
share of the population that uses the Internet frequently, and i_iugm, which provides the share of the 
population that uses bandwidth-intense Internet applications, to cover NGA-relevant consumer tastes. 
The number of Internet users per capita, int_user_pc, represents another proxy for the overall ICT 
affinity within a country. The educational level, edu, is measured as the percentage of the adult 
population that has completed at least upper-secondary education.  
Finally, network effects are considered by adding the lagged dependent variable, Fttx_hh(t-1), as a right-
hand-side variable to the empirical specification. Fttx_hh(t-1) measures the installed subscriber base and 
thus the aggregate demand in the previous period. 
6 Empirical specification 
6.1 The model 
As can be inferred from the literature review, some studies focus on broadband penetration, i.e. 
demand, while others focus on investment, i.e., the supply of broadband/NGA connections. Only a few 
[13] 
empirical studies explicitly identify broadband/NGA supply and/or demand or outline the underlying 
reduced-form approach. Our baseline specification refers to a reduced-form model in which demand is 
expressed in terms of NGA household adoption (in logs), ln(FTTx_hh). Imposing the equilibrium 
condition (demand = supply) eliminates the endogenous NGA-related price variable and yields the 
following econometric reduced-form specification:
17
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Equation (1) depends on the main variables of interest, i.e., regulation and competition, in state i in 
year t, as well as on a vector of demand and cost controls (Zi(t-1)). Note that Zi(t-1) also contains a 
measure of the average broadband price level, price_bb, which explicitly controls for the competitive 
outcome in first-generation broadband markets, allowing the estimation of the direct supply-side effect 
of regulation and competition. The additive error term εit is assumed to be i.i.d and θi represents 
country-specific effects. Equation (1) includes lagged values of all the exogenous variables. Assuming 
that adoption decisions at a particular point in time do not depend on contemporaneous but on the last 
period’s conditions makes sense as consumers’ adoption process will typically be related to switching 
costs, which might become reinforced in the case when long-term retail broadband contracts exist.
18
  
Any adoption process is inherently dynamic and thus it is crucial to separate out adequately the 
technological diffusion effects from the explanatory variables. The vast majority of the related 
empirical literature finds that (ICT) adoption processes are best described through S-shaped (logistic 
or Gompertz) functional curves that represent different versions of an exponential growth model, 
which ultimately converges to a certain saturation level.
19
 However, even in fibre-leading European 
countries, the NGA adoption processes are still in their early phase and far from being close to the 
respective inflection points.
20
 Therefore, NGA adoption can be approximated by a simpler exponential 
                                                     
17
  For a similar approach see Cava-Ferreruela and Alabau-Munoz (2006, pp. 450–451). The authors, however, 
do not eliminate the endogenous price variable but pool the whole set of available demand and supply 
variables in their specification of broadband penetration.  
18
  Also, with an insufficient number of observations one would run the risk of overfitting the data. The lagged 
specification in equation (1) allows the full employment of the available panel data set. 
19
  For recent and ICT-related diffusion studies see e.g. Grajek and Kretschmer (2009), Czernich et al. (2011) or 
Lee et al. (2011).  
20
  For recent evidence see Briglauer and Gugler (2012) or Samanta et al. (2012). In particular, note that one can 
infer from Figure A.1 that almost all the EU27 states are far from the adoption target defined in the EC’s 
Digital Agenda (“50% or more of European households subscribe to internet connections above 100 Mbps”). 
[14] 
growth model in equation (1), which relates NGA adoption (in logs), ln(FTTx_hhit), to a linear time 
trend, t.
21
  
Equation (2) represents a dynamic extension of the baseline specification in equation (1) in which the 
lagged dependent variable, ln(FTTx_hhi(t-1)), is included as a right-hand side variable (instead of the 
linear time trend, t). The coefficient α1 measures the importance of network effects that give rise to an 
endogenous adoption process if 0 < α1 < 1. (1 - α1) measures the constant “speed of diffusion”, λ, 
which comes from a Gompertz model of adoption (Kiiski and Pohjola 2002, pp. 299–300). λ is 
expressed as the percentage of the gap between the long-run (desired or target) stock of NGA 
subscribers and the subscribers in the previous period that is closed each period (Kiiski and Pohjola 
2002; Andres et al. 2010; Grajek and Röller 2012).
22
 Again, the additive error term µit is assumed to be 
i.i.d: 
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Estimating the reduced form in equations (1) and (2) enables comparative static analysis, which 
appears to be of prime importance for policy makers and in view of our policy-oriented research 
questions.
23
  
6.2 Identification 
The desire to measure causation and to avoid endogeneity in spite of the reliance on non-experimental 
data is the key concern in empirical economics (Wooldridge 2002, p. 421; Cameron and Trivedi 2005, 
p. 715). We argue, first of all, that the main source of endogeneity in the form of reverse causality is 
effectively eliminated by the reduced-form approach in equations (1) and (2): as we assess the impact 
of demand- and supply-side determinants related to first-generation broadband markets on second-
generation NGA markets, we can hardly imagine that the current NGA adoption influences, for 
instance, the previous regulation on broadband markets that was implemented by NRAs typically 
many years ago. Accordingly, reverse causality that might otherwise lead to endogeneity should 
represent no problem. Second, by lagging the explanatory variables, NGA adoption is related to 
predetermined values of the independent variables. In order to reinforce these arguments, we also 
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  Also, a log transformation helps to stabilize the series of our dependent variable. This represents a positive 
side effect in view of potential non-stationarity problems that cannot be tested formally given that our panel 
data set is unbalanced and neither the number of time periods (T ≤ 8) nor the number of cross-sectional units 
(n ≤ 27) tends to infinity (the “Im–Pesaran–Shin” unit-root test is designed for unbalanced panels but 
requires at least 10 observations per panel). 
22
  Let Fttx_hhit
*
 denote the desired long-run stock of NGA subscribers; then, the Gompertz model of diffusion 
specifies the rate of change as    )__(ln(_/1/_ )1(
*
 tiititit hhFttxhhFttxhhFttxthhFttx  . 
23
  For the sake of clarity, we drop the cross-sectional index in the remainder of the paper. 
[15] 
perform standard Granger causality tests. Third, we control for potential endogeneity due to 
unobserved and time-invariant heterogeneity by including fixed effects (θi) at the country level.  
7 Empirical results24 
Table 1 shows the main results using fixed-effects (“FE”) regressions to estimate our baseline 
specification (equation (1)). Regression (1) reports the FE estimates for the model specification that 
contains all the demand and cost controls (“Full”). The F-test (F_θ) following regression (1) shows 
that country-level FEs are significant, implying that pooled OLS would produce inconsistent estimates 
if the FEs are correlated with the independent variables. Regression (1) reports t-statistics assuming 
that the errors in equation (1) are i.i.d., which might induce misleading inference as well (Cameron 
and Trivedi 2005, pp. 711–712). Therefore, one has to control for both serial correlation and any 
arbitrary form of heteroskedasticity by calculating robust standard errors. For short panels (T ≤ 8 in 
our case), this strategy is preferred to modelling a specific error correlation structure (Cameron and 
Trivedi 2005, p. 725). Regression (2) contains FE estimates for the full model based on robust 
standard errors (“rob”). Note, however, that robust standard errors still assume that there is no 
contemporaneous correlation across the panel units. Typically, spatial dependence is unlikely to exist 
at the country level with short time series. However, Pesaran’s test of cross-sectional independence 
does not provide unambiguous evidence (the statistic is -1.721 with a p-value of 0.0852 for regression 
(3)). Regression (5) therefore reports the “Driscoll–Kraay” standard errors (“DK”), which are assumed 
to be heteroskedastic, autocorrelated up to some lag and possibly correlated between the panels 
(Driscoll and Kraay 1998; Hoechle 2007). 
In regressions (3) to (5), we eliminate all except the significant demand controls (int_user_pc(t-1), edu(t-
1)) and the least insignificant cost controls (wage(t-1), urban(t-1)).
25
 As it can be seen, the basic structure 
of the coefficients for the main variables remains effectively unchanged throughout regressions (1) to 
(5), which reassures us that those estimates are largely robust to alternative selections of control 
variables. The demand controls int_user_pc(t-1) and edu(t-1) are statistically significant with the expected 
signs in all the regressions in Table 1 and appear to capture ICT affinity and e-literacy best, 
respectively, as essential preconditions for the usage of high-speed broadband services.  
Not only are the cost controls wage(t-1) and urban(t-1) insignificant but also the variable urban(t-1) has an 
unexpected sign in regressions (1) and (2). Whereas insignificant cost estimates appear to be primarily 
due to country FEs (low within variation), the unexpected sign of urban(t-1) might be attributed to two 
opposing effects. First, in densely populated areas, NGA deployment can serve more customers at the 
same time, thus reducing the costs for a single fibre connection (economies of density). Second, 
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  STATA 12.1 is used to estimate the regressions. 
25
  Whereas urban(t-1) stands for demographic cost factors, wage(t-1) stands for construction costs. wage(t-1) is 
preferred to labcost_ict(t-1), since only the former has the expected (meaningful) sign. 
[16] 
however, the total digging costs are much higher in urban areas, where construction activities become 
more labour-intensive. We therefore include the interaction term urban*wage(t-1) in regressions (3) to 
(5) to capture this relationship. Indeed, urban(t-1) then shows the expected sign and its impact on NGA 
adoption decreases with increases in the wage level, wage(t-1), in regressions (3) to (5). 
With respect to period effects, we find that the linear time trend, t, is significant in regressions (3) and 
(5). With a constant annual growth rate of 0.5324 (= [exp(0.4268) – 1]) in regression (3), the number 
of subscribers would increase from its average value (0.05147) to the Digital Agenda’s target value 
(0.5) in about 5.4 years. Note, however, that this represents the most optimistic case, since constant 
exponential growth is unlikely to continue in later phases of the adoption process. We also estimate 
regression (3) as two-way FEs by including year dummies instead of the linear time trend. However, 
the year dummies are jointly insignificant (the F-statistic is 0.92; not reported in Table 1) and hence 
their inclusion would result in less efficient estimates.  
Overall, we refer to regressions (3) to (5) as final regressions (“Final”) as these are the most efficient 
specifications. When comparing regression (3) with regression (5), one finds that imposing “Driscoll–
Kraay” standard errors substantially increases the significance levels. However, as the estimator is 
based on an asymptotic theory, we have to consider the results with caution in view of our short panel. 
(Table 1 about here) 
Table 2 first represents in regression (6) the estimation results of model “Final_FE_rob”, which we 
consider to be our most appropriate specification (= regression (3) in Table 1). Regression (7) shows 
that the coefficient estimates remain virtually unchanged if we normalize our dependent variable with 
respect to the total population (“pop”) instead of the total number of households. The first difference 
(“FD”) specification in regression (8) also eliminates time-invariant heterogeneity but entails a 
substantial loss of efficiency. FD still shows similar estimates except for the coefficient of our 
regulation variable, reg_bb(t-1), which has the expected sign but is less well identified. Regression (9) 
reports the results of the random-effects (RE) specification. Although the RE coefficients show a 
similar structure and a similar coefficient estimate for the variable reg_bb(t-1), the FE specifications are 
clearly preferable in view of our observational data set.
26
  
Finally, regression (10) contains the estimation results of the specification that includes the lagged 
dependent variable, ln(Fttx_hh(t-1)), as an additional regressor (equation (2)). Estimating regression 
(10) by means of an ordinary FE (within or LSDV) estimator would yield inconsistent and biased 
results, since the lagged dependent variable and the error terms would be correlated (Nickell 1981). 
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  Conceptually, our analysis focuses on the EU27 member states, which represent a particular set of rather 
homogenous countries and cannot be considered as a random sample drawn from the population of all 
countries. Empirically, a heteroskedastic- and cluster-robust Hausman test strongly rejects the RE model (in 
regression (6), the Sargan–Hansen test statistic is 71.025, not reported in Table 2), on the grounds that the 
RE estimates will be inconsistent.  
[17] 
Bruno (2005a,b) developed a bias-corrected LSDV estimator (“LSDVC”) for unbalanced panel data.27 
Again, the structure of the LSDVC estimation results in regression (10) is similar to that of the 
previous regressions and most coefficients of the main variables of interest are significant with the 
expected signs. 
Apparently, the coefficient of the lagged dependent variable, ln(Fttx_hh(t-1)), is highly significant and 
substantial (α1 = 0.7056) in regression (10), which informs us about the relevance of the network 
effects underlying the adoption of NGA services. A 10% increase in the number of NGA connections 
per household in the previous period leads to an increase of about 7.1% in the number of current NGA 
connections. Although a high value of α1 might be due either to true state dependency or to correlation 
with unobserved heterogeneity (θi), a causal mechanism via the last period is likely because of the 
high potential of network effects for the adoption of new ICT services, as outlined in section 4.4. The 
speed of diffusion (λ = 1 - 0.7056) suggests that it will take around 6.5 years to close 90% of the gap 
between the average number of NGA connections per household (0.05147) and the Digital Agenda’s 
target value (0.5). Also, note that λ is significantly greater than zero, which confirms that migration to 
NGA services is subject to some non-negligible switching costs on the side of the consumers.
28
 
Regarding the main variables of interest, one first finds a significant and non-linear relationship with 
respect to our infrastructure-based competition variable, fms(t-1) and fms
2
(t-1), for all the FE regressions 
(including LSDVC). The maximum of the non-linear relationship informs us about the optimal 
competitive market conditions for NGA adoption. For instance, one can infer from the corresponding 
coefficient estimate in regression (3) in Table 1 (= regression (6) in Table 2) that a share of ~19.5% of 
fixed landlines is optimal. The grand mean of fms(t-1) is ~26.88% and thus above this optimal value, 
which means that the escape competition effect still dominates the Schumpeterian effect and fixed-to-
mobile substitution has exerted a positive impact on NGA adoption in the past. However, increasing 
competition from mobile networks brought the average value of this variable close to its optimum 
during the analysis period with )2004(fms  = 0.3317 and )2011(fms  = 0.2314.
29
  
                                                     
27
  A weakness of GMM estimators is that their properties only hold for a large number of cross-sectional units 
(n ≤ 27 in our case). Monte Carlo evidence supports the LSDVC estimator, which proves to be (much) more 
efficient than various instrumental variable-type estimators when n is small (Kiviet 1995). However, 
LSDVC is not applicable in the presence of endogenous regressors (Bruno 2005b). In view of the arguments 
in section 6.2, we are confident that there is no endogeneity problem as we control for unobserved 
heterogeneity; reverse causality also appears to be unlikely with respect to our empirical specification. To 
prove the latter, we also perform standard Granger causality tests (Granger 1969). The results, which are 
reported in Table A.3 in the Appendix, indicate that there is no bidirectional causality. 
28
  A recent survey of the European Commission (2012, p. 60) shows that a majority of EU citizens are not 
willing to switch to high-speed broadband services due to (i) lack of awareness of potential benefits, (ii) lack 
of experience with new services and (iii) expected price level of NGA services. 
29
  It is interesting to contrast this result with the corresponding finding of Briglauer et al. (2013), who measure 
mobile competition in a different way (based on survey data for the years from 2005 to 2010) but also find 
[18] 
The coefficient of the variable bb_lines_hh(t-1) is significantly negative in all the FE regressions 
(excluding LSDVC), from which we infer that there is a substantial replacement effect with reference 
to the first-generation broadband infrastructure. As the latter includes both DSL and cable connections, 
we also test whether there is a differential effect with respect to these forms of intramodal competition 
by including an additional interaction term, bb_lines*cable(t-1), in regression (4) in Table 1. As the 
corresponding coefficient is insignificant (as well as the coefficient of the main effect, cable(t-1)), we 
conclude that there is no differential impact and the replacement effect comes equally from both types 
of fixed broadband infrastructure. This result appears to be reasonable in view of the rather similar 
quality and price characteristics of intramodal coax and copper/DSL broadband retail services. 
Finally, we find a coefficient of the regulatory variable, reg_bb(t-1), which is estimated in the quite 
narrow range of -2.3210 to -2.3608 for the final FE regressions and significantly negative throughout 
all the estimations (except for the FD specification). This strongly supports our hypothesis outlined in 
section 4.1 that more intense regulation has a negative impact on the adoption of NGA services once 
we control for the price effect. The average estimate of the coefficient of reg_bb(t-1) (~ -2.35) implies 
that an increase in regulatory intensity of 10 percentage points leads to a decrease in NGA adoption of 
20.95% ([=exp(-2.35*0.1)-1]*100). Evaluated at the grand mean, which represents the average EU27 
member state, this implies an average decrease from 0.05147 to ~0.0407 NGA lines per household.  
The average broadband price variable, price_bb(t-1), is only marginally significant (except for the 
LSDVC specification in which the respective coefficient is highly significant). As it has a negative 
sign throughout, we infer that the price variable mainly stands proxy for a general broadband price 
level as presumed. Indeed, if we drop price_bb(t-1) from the regressions, the coefficient of reg_bb(t-1) 
increases throughout in absolute terms (e.g., from ~-2.352 to ~-2.435 in regression (3)), which shows 
that the price effect is opposed to the negative effect of regulation on NGA investment. However, since 
this increase is not significant, we infer that the negative direct impact of regulation on supply-side 
investment activities dominates the price effect on the demand side.  
(Table 2 about here) 
8 Summary and final remarks 
This work identifies the effects of sector-specific ex ante regulation and infrastructure competition on 
the adoption of NGA services in Europe using a recent panel data set of EU27 countries. As opposed 
to the related literature, the econometric specification explicitly addresses the endogeneity problem 
mainly by relating NGA adoption to regulation and competition in preceding broadband markets.  
                                                                                                                                                                      
that competition stemming from mobile networks has increased but is well below its optimum value on 
average.  
[19] 
The results indicate firstly that NGA adoption is negatively influenced by the extent and effectiveness 
of the wholesale broadband access regulation that is imposed on the incumbent’s first-generation DSL 
infrastructure. Also, it should be pointed out that the impact of regulation is quite substantial. 
Accordingly, the goals of the EC’s Digital Agenda seem to be at odds with the sector-specific EU 
regulatory framework, which intends to expand strict cost-based access regulation to the emerging 
NGA infrastructure and corresponding NGA wholesale access services. Realizing the targets of the EC 
to reach 50% adoption with 100 Mbit/s high-speed Internet connections by 2020 becomes much more 
unlikely if the prime importance is attached to high-cost FTTH/B deployment scenarios (Briglauer and 
Gugler 2012). Secondly, competition stemming from mobile networks affects NGA adoption in a non-
linear way, as expected. With respect to the time frame of our analysis, the positive impact of the 
escape competition effect dominates the Schumpeterian effect. Thirdly, we also found evidence of a 
significant replacement effect underlying the first-generation broadband infrastructure, which might 
become even more reinforced in the future in view of the potential of new DSL and coax technologies. 
Finally, our dynamic specification suggests that substantial network effects give rise to an endogenous 
NGA adoption process. As this process exhibits high growth potential, the adoption target of the EC 
appears to be still feasible timewise, if one refers to a broad NGA definition and if NGA adoption is 
not endangered by shocks on the demand or supply side or, most notably, by wrong policy incentives.  
It should be noted once again that the intention of the paper is neither to identify the demand or supply 
related to NGA adoption and deployment, respectively, nor to analyse the dynamics of the involved 
adjustment processes; instead, the paper focuses on the marginal effects of the main policy variables of 
interest by means of comparative static analysis. In view of the dynamic interaction of supply and 
demand, a proverbial chicken-and-egg situation gives rise to a coordination problem: it is not clear a 
priori whether there has to be demand for new, attractive and bandwidth-hungry services in advance in 
order to enforce the deployment of new communications infrastructure or whether those services and 
applications will automatically evolve after the necessary infrastructure has been put in place. Internet 
history indicates that the development of content and applications usually follows infrastructure 
deployment, e.g. there would be none of the Web 2.0 services and social platforms available in a world 
with narrowband dial-up Internet infrastructure. This view suggests that the goals of the EC’s Digital 
Agenda can be reached best if NGA deployment is primarily driven by the supply side, either by 
means of deregulatory approaches or via optimal competitive market conditions, as indicated by our 
results and the vast majority of the broadband-related literature.  
[20] 
Table 1: Estimation results for the adoption model (dependent variable: ln(Fttx_hhit)) 
Regression (nr.) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Full_FE Full_FE_ 
rob 
Final_FE_ 
rob 
Final_FE_ 
rob_i 
Final_FE_ 
rob_DK 
reg_bb(t-1) -1.8962** -1.8962** -2.3515*** -2.3166** -2.3515*** 
 (-2.29) (-2.33) (-2.99) (-2.74) (-4.08) 
      
price_bb(t-1) -0.0258* -0.0258* -0.0270 -0.0266 -0.0270*** 
 (-1.92) (-1.81) (-1.58) (-1.50) (-5.60) 
      
fms(t-1) 57.1295*** 57.1295* 45.0935** 47.0737** 45.0935*** 
 (3.60) (1.97) (2.27) (2.19) (4.84) 
      
fms
2
(t-1) -136.263*** -136.2630** -115.5386** -115.9163** -115.54*** 
 (-4.67) (-2.39) (-2.75) (-2.66) (-5.62) 
      
bb_lines_hh(t-1) -6.6056*** -6.6056*** -4.9070* -5.2888** -4.9070*** 
 (-2.92) (-2.94) (-1.99) (-2.22) (-4.12) 
      
int_user_pc(t-1) 8.1608** 8.1608** 5.1423** 4.4192 5.1423*** 
 (2.00) (2.18) (2.14) (1.46) (3.43) 
      
edu(t-1) 0.2315*** 0.2315*** 0.1577** 0.1516* 0.1577* 
 (2.98) (3.15) (2.22) (2.00) (1.94) 
      
telco_rev_hh(t-1) 51.5279 51.5279    
 (0.11) (0.08)    
      
i_iday(t-1) -0.8730 -0.8730    
 (-0.17) (-0.13)    
      
i_iugm(t-1) -1.2253 -1.2253    
 (-0.41) (-0.41)    
      
gdp_pc_ppp(t-1) 0.0000 0.0000    
 (0.46) (0.65)    
      
hh_dens(t-1) 2.4201 2.4201    
 (0.60) (0.63)    
      
labcost_ict(t-1) 0.0276 0.0276    
 (1.09) (0.90)    
      
labcost(t-1) -0.0071 -0.0071    
 (-0.41) (-0.45)    
      
wage(t-1) -0.1330 -0.1330 0.9914 0.8436 0.9914* 
 (-0.66) (-0.78) (1.40) (1.24) (1.82) 
      
urban(t-1) -0.3195 -0.3195 0.1094 0.1736 0.1094 
 (-1.19) (-0.97) (0.31) (0.46) (0.44) 
  
[21] 
mdw(t-1) -0.0026 -0.0026    
 (-0.73) (-0.72)    
      
t 0.3753 0.3753 0.4268* 0.4886* 0.4268*** 
 (1.40) (1.17) (1.71) (1.76) (4.78) 
      
urban*wage(t-1)   -0.0161 -0.0145 -0.0161** 
   (-1.57) (-1.49) (-2.28) 
      
bb_lines*cable(t-1)    -10.3659  
    (-0.78)  
      
cable_entr(t-1)    10.5496  
    (0.87)  
      
Constant -12.2036 -12.2036 -25.0350 -29.5231 -25.0350* 
 (-0.52) (-0.45) (-1.07) (-1.18) (-1.78) 
Adjusted R
2
 0.634 0.705 0.731 0.723  
R
2
_o 0.0202 0.0202 0.0226 0.0350  
R
2
_w 0.7406 0.7406 0.7482 0.7439 0.7482 
F 16.6541 176.1775 26.5819 26.4628 1685.8718 
F_θ 7.8923     
RMSE 0.9353 0.8406 0.8530 0.8563  
Obs 149 149 175 174 175 
Regressions (1) to (5) include country-specific fixed effects (FE), which are not reported. The t-statistics in 
parentheses are based on panel robust standard errors in regressions (2) to (5). Indeed, a Wooldridge test for 
autocorrelation indicates that there is first-order autocorrelation in the data. Likewise, a Wald test for groupwise 
heteroskedasticity clearly rejects the null hypothesis of a constant variance. Regression (5) employs “Driscoll–
Kraay” standard errors (“DK”), whereby the autocorrelation structure has a lag length of 
m(T)=floor[4(T/100)^(2/9)], which turned out to be robust to alternative lag specifications. 
*
 p < 0.10, 
**
 p < 
0.05, 
***
 p < 0.01.   
[22] 
Table 2: Estimation results for different specifications of the “Final” adoption model  
Regression nr. (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
 Final_FE_ 
rob 
Final_FE_
rob_pop 
Final_FD_ 
rob 
RE_Final_ 
rob 
LSDVC_Final 
lnFttx_hh(t-1)     0.7056
***
 
     (8.82) 
      
reg_bb(t-1) -2.3515
***
 -2.3608
***
 -0.6629 -2.6598
***
 -2.1195
***
 
 (-2.99) (-2.99) (-1.52) (-2.68) (-2.83) 
      
price_bb(t-1) -0.0270 -0.0274 -0.0214
*
 -0.0277 -0.0243
***
 
 (-1.58) (-1.60) (-1.81) (-1.49) (-2.70) 
      
fms(t-1) 45.0935
**
 44.9592
**
 27.3118 29.8178 18.0557
*
 
 (2.27) (2.26) (1.50) (1.33) (1.90) 
      
fms
2
(t-1) -115.5386
**
 -115.5528
**
 -63.7250
*
 -71.9990 -39.9050
**
 
 (-2.75) (-2.73) (-1.74) (-1.55) (-2.08) 
      
bb_lines_hh(t-1) -4.9070
*
 -4.9498
*
 -4.1934
**
 -3.0706 -1.0464 
 (-1.99) (-2.01) (-2.12) (-1.34) (-0.72) 
      
int_user_pc(t-1) 5.1423
**
 5.0215
**
 4.3991
**
 6.5363
***
 2.0246 
 (2.14) (2.11) (2.60) (3.04) (0.91) 
      
edu(t-1) 0.1577
**
 0.1581
**
  0.0292 0.0338 
 (2.22) (2.22)  (0.94) (0.50) 
      
urban(t-1) 0.1094 0.1164  -0.0131 -0.0107 
 (0.31) (0.33)  (-0.25) (-0.04) 
      
wage(t-1) 0.9914 1.0140  -0.0284 -0.0699 
 (1.40) (1.43)  (-0.15) (-0.11) 
      
urban*wage(t-1) -0.0161 -0.0164  0.0008 0.0002 
 (-1.57) (-1.60)  (0.35) (0.02) 
      
t 0.4268
*
 0.4325
*
  0.3365  
 (1.71) (1.73)  (1.54)  
      
Constant -25.0350 -26.3051 0.5745
***
 -12.1558
**
  
 (-1.07) (-1.12) (3.25) (-2.34)  
Adjusted R
2
 0.731 0.732 0.089   
R
2
_o 0.0226 0.0173  0.4763  
R
2
_w 0.7482 0.7493  0.7127  
F 26.5819 26.7343 2.2558   
RMSE 0.8530 0.8532 0.8385 0.9821  
Obs 175 175 149 175 162 
The t-statistics in parentheses are based on panel robust standard errors in regressions (6) to (9). The LSDVC 
standard errors in regression (10) are bootstrapped based on 100 iterations with bias correction initialized by the 
Arellano and Bond estimator for estimates up to order O(1/T). 
*
 p < 0.10, 
**
 p < 0.05, 
***
 p < 0.01.   
[23] 
Annex 
Figure A.1: NGA household adoption levels for FTTx and FTTH/B technologies in the EU27 
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Horizontal reference line at 0.5 indicates target value of the EC´s Digital Agenda.
Source: FTTH Council Europe. Fttx and FttH/B household adoption levels are (essentially) zero in MT (CY).
As data for Luxembourg is available only for 2009 onwards and due to its exceptionally high FTTx adoption level, Luxemborug is not included in Figure A.1.
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Table A.1: Variable description and sources 
Variable 
(expected sign) 
Description Source* 
 Dependent variable(s)  
FTTx connections 
per household, 
Fttx_hh 
(Fttx_pop) 
Number of households connected by FTTx 
technologies normalized to a country’s total number 
of households  
(normalized to total population) 
©FTTH Council 
Europe
(a)
 
 Main explanatory variables  
Extent of 
broadband access 
regulation, 
reg_bb (-) 
Share of regulated lines (local loop unbundling, 
bitstream, resale) to total retail broadband lines 
(minus cable entrant lines) 
EU Progress Report
(b)
 
Broadband price, 
price_bb (?/-) 
Average monthly cost of capped/uncapped residential 
fixed broadband for 1 Mbps–10 Mbps in euros 
excluding VAT. Tariffs are a weighted average of 
representative stand-alone products of incumbent and 
entrant operators whose accumulative subscribers are 
over 90% of each country’s total broadband market 
©Quantum-Web 
Limited
(c)
 
Broadband lines, 
bb_lines_hh (-) 
Number of total retail broadband lines (DSL and 
coax) as a share of the total number of subscribed 
households  
EU Progress Report 
©EUROMONITOR 
(households) 
Fixed-to-mobile 
substitution, 
fms (+(levels) 
- (squared term)) 
Share of the total number of fixed landlines to the 
total number of fixed lines and mobile subscribers. 
Mobile-cellular telephone subscriptions include the 
number of postpaid subscriptions and the number of 
active prepaid accounts (which have been used 
during the last three months). They exclude 
subscriptions via data cards or USB modems. Fixed-
landlines refer to the number of active lines 
connecting subscribers’ terminal equipment to the 
PSTN 
ITU
(d)
 
Cable lines, 
cable (?) 
Number of total retail broadband cable lines run by 
entrants as a share of the total retail broadband lines 
EU Progress Report 
 
 Control variables  
Education, 
edu (+) 
Percentage of the adult population (25–64 years old) 
that has completed at least upper-secondary 
education 
EUROSTAT
(e)
 
GDP per capita, 
gdp_pc_ppp (+) 
GDP per capita and PPP adjusted in current US$ World Bank
(f)
 
Average revenue, 
telco_rev_hh (+) 
Total telecommunications revenues in mn US$ per 
household with constant 2011 prices and fixed 2011 
exchange rates 
©EUROMONITOR
(g)
 
Heavy Internet use, 
i_iugm (+) 
 
Share of the population using bandwidth-intense 
Internet services (games, films, music ...) 
EUROSTAT/ 
COCOM 
Heavy Internet 
users, 
i_iday (+) 
Share of the population using Internet services every 
or almost every day 
EUROSTAT/ 
COCOM
(h)
 
[25] 
Table A.1: Variable description and sources (cont`d) 
Variable 
(expected sign) 
Description Source* 
Household density, 
hh_dens (+) 
Average number of household members, expressed as 
a share of a country’s population in its total number 
of households 
©EUROMONITOR 
(households) 
EUROSTAT 
(population) 
Internet users, 
int_user_pc (+) 
Internet users per capita ©EUROMONITOR 
ICT labour cost 
index,  
labcost_ICT (-) 
Annual ICT labour cost index normalized to 100 in 
2008  
EUROSTAT 
Labour cost index, 
labcost (-) 
Annual labour cost index normalized to 100 in 2005 © EIU
(i)
 
Multiple dwellings,  
mdw (+) 
Annual building permits – number of two and more 
dwellings normalized to 100 in 2005 
EUROSTAT 
Wage per hour, 
wage (-) 
Wage per hour manufacturing in US$ with constant 
2011 prices, fixed 2011 exchange rates 
© EIU 
Urban population, 
urban (+) 
Urban population as a percentage of the total 
population 
©EIU 
* Note that some sources are commercially available only (©), while others are publicly available.  
(a) FTTH Council Europe is a non-profit industry organization, the aim of which is to enforce the deployment of 
fibre-optic technology in Europe. Data are collected by IDATE (www.idate.org) through desk research, direct 
contact with FTTx players, information exchange with FTTH Council Europe members and from IDATE 
partners. Data from June 2005 to June 2011 and December 2011 (= 2012) are available to its members at: 
http://www.ftthcouncil.eu/resources?category_id=6. Data for Bulgaria and Luxembourg are available only for 
2009 onwards. There are no data for Malta and the number of subscribers for Cyprus is de facto time-constant 
and essentially null (with one rise from 100 to 120 FTTx lines). (b) The EU “Progress Report on the Single 
European Electronic Communications Market” for data from 2004 to 2011 is available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/information_society/policy/ecomm/library/communications_reports/index_en.htm. There are 
missing values for Bulgaria and Romania for the years from 2004 to 2006. (c) Data are based on a quarterly 
monitoring service that harvests over 2000 fixed broadband tariffs across 100 countries. A few missing values for 
the variable price_bb had to be linearly interpolated. (d) The ITU World Telecommunication/ICT Indicators 
Database is available at: http://www.itu.int/ITU-D/ict/statistics/. (e) Data are available at: 
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/information_society/data/database. Data for i_iugm are 
available only for the years from 2004 to 2010 and there are a few missing values for the variables i_iugm and 
iday, which had to be linearly interpolated. (f) The World Bank’s “World Development Indicators” are available 
at: http://data.worldbank.org. (g) The Euromonitor International database is available at: 
http://www.euromonitor.com/. The number of households in 2012 was set equal to the number in 2011. (h) Data 
collected by EC services, through NRAs, for the Communications Committee (COCOM). (i) The Economist 
Intelligence Unit country database is available at: https://eiu.bvdep.com/frame.html.  
[26] 
Table A.2: Summary statistics 
Variable Variation Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Obs* 
Fttx_hh overall 0.0514702 0.1047494 3.77E-06 0.8574688 N = 191 
 
between 
 
0.1182229 0.0003915 0.6090008 n = 26 
 
within 
 
0.053404 -0.2063078 0.3651736 T = 7.35 
         Fttx_pop overall 0.0212465 0.0406438 1.52E-06 0.3171702 N = 191
 between  0.0442877 0.000135 0.2252358 n = 26 
 within  0.0218185 -0.0724796 0.1573267 T = 7.35 
         reg_bb overall 0.2435517 0.2218102 0 0.9947678 N = 210 
 
between 
 
0.1927122 0.0007791 0.7037244 n = 27 
 
within 
 
0.1177948 -0.1030858 0.9905862 T = 7.77 
         price_bb overall 29.76357 15.75987 5.26 99.89 N = 226 
 
between 
 
6.735677 14.76 42.9425 n = 27 
 
within 
 
14.45547 -1.438927 87.1408 T = 8.37 
         fms overall 0.2688139 0.0746535 0.1076148 0.437505 N = 216 
 
between 
 
0.0652995 0.1467276 0.3925803 n = 27 
 
within 
 
0.0380519 0.1677713 0.4134962 T = 8 
         edu overall 68.26574 13.96395 26 86.1 N = 216 
 
between 
 
14.02081 28.7375 84.2125 n = 27 
 
within 
 
2.192978 61.44074 74.80324 T = 8 
         gdp_pc_ppp overall 29405.69 13476.8 8730.804 89055.8 N = 216 
 
between 
 
13352.13 12284.78 80394.91 n = 27 
 
within 
 
3024.771 13967.07 38066.58 T = 8 
         telco_rev_hh overall 0.0023742 0.0010328 0.0004868 0.0046744 N = 216 
 
between 
 
0.001019 0.0007302 0.0041021 n = 27 
 
within 
 
0.0002493 0.0015673 0.0031638 T = 8 
         i_iday overall 0.4021399 0.1808903 0.036 0.8039 N = 216 
 
between 
 
0.1431649 0.1363003 0.6732108 n = 27 
 
within 
 
0.1135449 0.1730875 0.6173487 T = 8 
         i_iugm overall 0.2317125 0.0926456 0.0479 0.5073836 N = 189 
 
between 
 
0.0711529 0.1299117 0.4058385 n = 27 
 
within 
 
0.0606799 -0.029026 0.4552803 T = 7 
         bb_lines_hh overall 0.4201162 0.2130044 0.0069897 0.8752053 N = 210 
 
between 
 
0.134138 0.1841686 0.6984428 n = 27 
 
within 
 
0.1673422 -0.0182887 0.7883213 T = 7.77 
  
[27] 
Table A.2: Summary statistics (cont`d) 
* n denotes the number of individual units and N denotes the total number of individual time 
observations. Uppercase T denotes the number of time periods (annual observations).  
Variable Variation Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Obs* 
cable overall 0.0898561 0.0843489 0 0.377342 N = 209 
 
between 
 
0.0734082 0 0.2756474 n = 27 
 
within 
 
0.0423109 -0.1400215 0.2205538 T = 7.75 
         hh_dens overall 2.507075 0.2827785 1.999367 3.204768 N = 243 
 
between 
 
0.2841833 2.017063 3.002026 n = 27 
 
within 
 
0.0432815 2.404574 2.801087 T = 9 
         int_user_pc overall 0.6064277 0.1844711 0.1500006 0.9325179 N = 216 
 
between 
 
0.1598241 0.3020208 0.8754859 n = 27 
 
within 
 
0.0965272 0.3604697 0.8102632 T = 8 
         labcost_ICT overall 96.27037 13.70907 47.7 165.1 N = 216 
 
between 
 
5.409287 82.0625 105.7625 n = 27 
 
within 
 
12.63451 57.79537 160.2454 T = 8 
         labcost overall 112.0291 21.62619 81.4439 226.7329 N = 213 
 
between 
 
13.68069 100.4715 153.58 n = 27 
 
within 
 
17 45.38391 193.4653 T = 7.89 
         mdw overall 89.98745 46.11853 9.96 344.11 N = 216 
 
between 
 
28.42763 43.29 184.8463 n = 27 
 
within 
 
36.6756 -15.2588 249.2512 T = 8 
         wage overall 16.00741 11.13623 1.6 51.4 N = 216 
 
between 
 
1.13E+01 1.975 49.75 n = 27 
 
within 
 
0.7132549 13.35741 18.54491 T = 8 
         urban overall 72.08326 11.79625 48.6801 97.4358 N = 216 
 
between 
 
11.97782 49.31314 97.34392 n = 27 
 
within 
 
0.5954232 69.90087 74.22487 T = 8 
         t overall 5 2.587318 1 9 N = 243 
 
between 
 
0 5 5 n = 27 
 
within 
 
2.587318 1 9 T = 9 
[28] 
Table A.3: Standard (direct) Granger causality tests with LSDVC* 
Regression nr. (A.1) (A.2) (A.3) (A.4) 
Dependent var. logFttx_hh(t) reg_bb(t-1) price_bb(t-1) fms(t-1) 
Independent var.     
logFttx_hh(t-1) 0.7033***    
 (9.08)    
     
logFttx_hh(t-2)  -0.0226 0.0572 0.0002 
  (-1.23) (0.05) (0.12) 
     
logFttx_hh(t-3)  0.0077 -0.1574 0.0009 
  (0.53) (-0.17) (0.67) 
     
reg_bb(t-2) -1.2063* 0.2256* -6.2001 -0.0007 
 (-1.94) (1.80) (-0.73) (-0.05) 
     
price_bb(t-2) -0.0085 0.0004 0.4371*** 0.0000 
 (-0.79) (0.20) (3.51) (0.19) 
     
fms(t-2) 7.2783 1.2461 220.0209* 1.0701*** 
 (0.70) (0.66) (1.82) (10.41) 
     
fms
2
(t-2) -10.8759 -2.6688 -399.1218* -0.6293*** 
 (-0.58) (-0.70) (-1.66) (-3.18) 
     
Granger causality tests with p-values of χ2 tests of joint significance of respective 
coefficients displayed in bold in regressions (A.1) to (A.4): 
Prob > χ2 (lag1) 0.0365** 0.4637 0.9853 0.6585 
Obs 150 113 112 113 
Prob > χ2 (lag 2) 0.0780* 0.3005 0.6417 0.5080 
Obs 124 112 112 112 
* Since Granger causality tests require the inclusion of lagged dependent variables, we had to use the LSDVC 
specification (regression (10) in Table 2). In order to test for reverse causality, all the variables with significant 
coefficients in regression (10) are considered. LSDVC calculates a bias-corrected LSDV estimator in which the 
dependent variable is lagged once on the left-hand side. Therefore, we include only one lag of the respective 
dependent variable in regressions (A.1) to (A.4). In regression (A.1), causation is established, since our main 
regulatory and competition variables are jointly significant in line with our baseline specification. The lower part 
of Table A.3 shows the p-values for the Granger χ2 test once for the inclusion of one lag and once for the 
inclusion of two lags of the independent variables (the corresponding coefficient estimates and t-statistics for the 
latter case are not reported in Table A.3). For regressions (A.2) to (A.4), the Granger causality χ2 statistics are 
highly insignificant, suggesting that there is, as expected, no reverse causality.  
The LSDVC standard errors in regression (A.1) to (A.4) are bootstrapped based on 100 iterations with bias 
correction initialized by the Arellano and Bond estimator for estimates up to order O(1/T). * p < 0.10, ** p < 
0.05, *** p < 0.01.  
  
[29] 
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